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Maitreesh Ghatak, Chinmaya Kumar, and Sandip Mitra examine the factors that determine whether
beneficiaries prefer receiving in-kind or cash transfers.
In the last few decades, there has been growing interest in the use of cash transfer (CT) programmes, rather than
direct provision by the government, to achieve a wide range of developmental goals. The Government of India
recently launched the ‘Direct Benefit Transfer’ that aims to reduce the leakages in various welfare programmes by
directly transferring the benefits to the beneficiaries’ accounts. The government’s plan to replace in-kind transfer
(IKT) programmes – including the public distribution system (PDS) – with a CT programme has been fiercely
debated.
The proponents of the CT approach argue that most IKTs have failed to deliver because their implementation
requires active involvement of the public administration, which lacks capacity and is unaccountable. Other criticisms
against IKTs include corruption and leakage, supply of substandard quality, and to the extent local governments are
involved, political bias in distribution. The supporters of IKTs, on the other hand, point to disadvantages inherent in a
CT programme – misuse of money, price fluctuations in the underdeveloped rural markets, greater vulnerability of
women and elderly – and argue that reforming the existing programme is a more sensible approach than replacing it
with a CT programme.
This debate has brought up a wide range of issues that needs to be considered while assessing the relative efficacy
of benefits transfers. However, it is also becoming polarised, and the tendency to argue either for or against the cash
transfers has diverted our attention from understanding the reasons why a particular transfer programme works or
fails in a given context.
To improve understanding of root causes, we need to develop an analytical framework to systematically explore how
various forms of benefits transfers interact with a wide range of household and community-level factors. We need
more empirical evidence on the performance of cash transfer programmes that replace existing in-kind transfer
programmes. We also need to study beneficiary preference between different forms of transfers—unconditional cash
transfers, conditional cash transfers, and IKTs.
This paper attempts to fill some of these gaps by studying the performance of a conditional cash transfer scheme in
Bihar, Mukhyamantri Cycle Yojna (Chief Minister’s Bicycle Programme), which provides money to purchase a
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bicycle to every student who is enrolled in standard nine of a government run/aided school (from the academic year
2012-13, the government also imposed an additional conditionality: only children with at least 75 per cent
attendance would receive money for the bicycle). We conducted a household survey among beneficiaries of this
programme in 36 villages spread across six districts of Bihar in September and October, 2012, to answer the
following questions:
How has this programme performed in terms transferring the benefits to eligible beneficiaries?
Whether the money received under this programme was utilised by the beneficiaries to purchase a bicycle?
What are the factors that determine whether the beneficiaries use the programme money to purchase a
bicycle?
Whether the beneficiaries prefer receiving a bicycle instead of cash?
What are the determinants of beneficiaries’ preference for cash versus kind?
Basic results
The data reveals that only 3 per cent of the total beneficiaries reported not having benefited despite meeting
the eligibility criteria. This suggests that this programme has done remarkably well in terms of covering the
beneficiaries who meet the eligibility criteria.
93.3 per cent of the beneficiaries received the right amount of money. This clearly means that it is very difficult
for school authorities to make money by denying the eligible beneficiaries the amount they are entitled to
receive.
Approximately 10 per cent of beneficiaries reported receiving a coupon or a bicycle, and the rest received the
benefit in the form of cash. This suggests that there is a possibility that 10 per cent of the beneficiaries may
not have received a bicycle worth their entitlement. The phenomenon of transferring benefits in the forms of
coupon or cycle seems more prevalent in underdeveloped districts.
Only 9 per cent of the households had any kind of grievances related to the programme, which suggests that
a large majority of the beneficiaries were satisfied with the programme.
98 per cent of households surveyed did buy a bicycle using the programme money (though this data is likely
to be biased as beneficiaries may not want to report that they ‘misused’ the programme money).
Only 45 per cent of the beneficiaries surveyed preferred receiving cash over kind.
Determinants of households’ preference between cash and kind
A wide range of factors can influence households’ preference for cash versus kind: the programme design, its
implementation, households’ socio-economic characteristics, and access to markets. It would be useful to classify
most of these factors in two categories: the demand side and the supply side. The demand side includes factors
relating to various household and village characteristics: income level, access to credit, household size, occupation,
distance from the district town and bicycle stores, etc. The supply side, on the other hand, includes factors that
determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the programme. The following are some of the key supply-side factors:
Conditionality: The cash transferred under this programme comes with a condition that the beneficiaries submit a
receipt provided by the bicycle store on purchasing a bicycle. But our data shows that around 30 per cent of the
beneficiaries had to submit a receipt even before they received the money from the school. This means that the
beneficiaries who submitted a receipt before receiving the money had to either purchase a bicycle using their own
funds or had to arrange for a fake receipt.
Delays in payment: The data suggests that there are often huge delays in disbursement of money—half the
beneficiaries reported that they received the money after they had entered the tenth grade, meaning that it was
delayed by at least six months.
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Inadequate money: Almost every beneficiary (98 per cent) had to add money in order to purchase a bicycle. The
market price of the cheapest bicycles ranges between 3,100 and 3,300 rupees, requiring beneficiaries to add at
least 600 to 700 rupees at minimum. The inadequacy of the transfers might make some households less likely to
support a cash transfer programme.
In terms of preference for cash or kind: Beneficiaries who had to submit a receipt before receiving the money were
20 percentage points less likely to prefer cash compared to those who submitted the receipt after receiving the
money. None of the other supply side factors seem to have any impact on beneficiaries’ preference for cash versus
kind.
Key demand-side factors include:
Income and liquidity constraints: We have seen earlier that the money provided under this programme is not
sufficient to purchase a new bicycle and most beneficiaries have to spend additional money to make the final
purchase—72 per cent of the beneficiaries used their own savings, while 25 per cent had to borrow money.
Beneficiaries who are poor or facing short-term financial problems may not like this programme even if it performs
well in terms of reducing leakages.
Self-control problems and intra-household conflict: Households with greater intra-household conflicts or with
self-control problems may prefer receiving benefits in-kind as it works as a commitment device, assuming resale is
not an easy option.
In terms of preference for cash or kind: Unlike supply-side factors, demand-side factors have significant effects on
beneficiary preference. Beneficiaries belonging to richer households are more likely to prefer cash over kind than
those belonging to poorer households. This might be because the money provided under this programme is
insufficient to purchase a new bicycle and most beneficiaries need to add money. While the rich can use their own
savings, the poor have no option but to borrow—the results show that beneficiaries who had to borrow the additional
money required to purchase a bicycle were 16 percentage points less likely to prefer cash over kind than
households who used their own savings to meet this requirement. Moreover, beneficiaries who belong to villages
that are very far from a bicycle store were less likely to prefer cash over kind.
Overall, the results from our survey show that the bicycle programme has performed well in terms of coverage rate
and curtailing direct forms of corruption. However, a large majority of the beneficiaries stated their preference in
favour of receiving the benefits in-kind instead of cash. Our analysis of determinants of beneficiaries’ preference for
cash versus kind suggest that the demand-side factors and village characteristics (accessibility of markets) play a
dominant role in shaping beneficiaries’ preference, though a few supply-side factors related to how conditionalities
are imposed also seem to matter.
For more information, including a discussion on the data and findings, see M. Ghatak, C. Kumar, and S. Mitra,
“Cash versus kind: Understanding the preferences of the bicycle-programme beneficiaries in Bihar ”, International
Growth Centre Working Paper, July 2013.
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